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Abstract
Mathematics and the real world
In this article the initial discussion of the untenability of the distinction 
between “pure” and “applied" mathematics is followed by looking at alter­
native approaches regarding the relationship between mathematics and the 
“real world” -  with intuitionism and Platonism representing the two opposite 
positions. The notions of infinity as well as the totality character of spatial 
continuity (and its implied infinite divisibility) turned out to occupy a central 
position in this context. In the final section brief attention is given -  against 
the background of some perspectives on the history of mathematics -  to an 
alternative approach in which both the uniqueness and the mutual 
irreducibility of number and space are conjectured.
1. Introduction
Mathematics acquired a distinctive and respectable status first and 
foremost owing to its apparently exact mode of thought and its ability to 
achieve rigorous results based upon sound assumptions. It was con­
sidered to be the “acme of sound reasoning” -  as Kline describes it 
(Kline, 1980:275). For the greater part of the history of their subject 
matter mathematicians did not find it strange to integrate their views on 
mathematics with their more encompassing convictions about reality as a 
whole. The Pythagoreans, for instance, believed that everything in reality 
is number. Leibniz combined his calculus with his monadology and 
Cantor even saw his transflnite cardinal numbers as steps towards the 
throne o f God (“Stufen zum Throne Gottes”).
The belief that mathematics reveals something about the “real world” 
received its first and lasting impetus from the Platonic conception of the 
world of ideal forms in which the mathematical e/de occupied an 
intermediate position. They resembled the true e/'cte by being immovable 
and eternal and like sensory things, they permit plurality within the same 
form -  though there are many congruent triangles, the ontic form (eidos) 
of the triangle is a unity without plurality.
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2. “Pure”and “applied” mathematics
It seems as if the well-known statement made by Leopold Kronecker 
more than hundred years ago tries to separate the domain of number 
into a God-created and human-made part: “The whole numbers were 
made by the loving God. All else is made by humankind”.1 Does it mean 
that -  on the basis of the God-given natural numbers -  mathematicians 
have to explore the interrelationships between them? At the Second 
International Congress of Mathematicians (Paris, 1900) Poincaré, said: 
“Today there remain in analysis only integers and finite or infinite 
systems of integers” (Frankel etal., 1973:14).
During the second half of the nineteenth century it became fashionable to 
divide mathematics into two parts, “pure” and “applied”, although the 
latter term goes back at least to the Mathematische WOrterbuch (Leibzig 
1808) of Georg Simon Klugel where we find an article on “Mathematik” 
(vol. 3).
Mathematics is the science of the forms of magnitudes, it concerns all 
the ways in which a magnitude is composed out of other ones ... 
Mathematics is subdivided into a pure and an applied section. The pure 
section, which is mathematics in the proper sense, is thus called 
because all the concepts, inferences, syntheses and analyses of 
magnitudes are built immediately by the human understanding, entirely 
pure and independent of every support by sensory knowledge and 
experience (cf. Laugwitz, 1972).
This article proceeds by distinguishing two main parts within the domain 
of applied mathematics: (i) physical applied mathematics and (ii) 
technical mathematics. The former encompasses mechanics, astronomy, 
and optics -  subdisciplines in which “pure mathematics” reigns; the latter 
comprises seven radically divergent subdivisions, namely:
• practical mathematics (the art of mercantilists, juristic and political 
calculations);
•  practical geometry (the art of field measuring, forest geometry, market 
divisions);
• practical mechanics (currently machine construction);
•  civil construction;
•  water construction-,
1 “Die ganzen Zahlen hat der liebe Gott gemacht. Alles andere ist Menschenwerk” -  
Kronecker (1886:19).
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• sciences of war (divided into artillery, reinforcement, strategy and 
tactics);
• sciences o f the sea (the construction of ships, managing of ships, 
navigation). One of the most significant mathematical journals of the 
19th century (founded in 1826 by August Leopold Crelle) -  Journal fur 
die reine und angewandte Mathematik -  linked the name of its 
founder with the idea of “applied mathematics”.2 It is remarkable that 
some of the “purest” mathematical contributions of Georg Cantor was 
published in this journal (see Cantor, 1874:258-262; Cantor, 1878: 
242-248).
If we compare the mentioned article of Georg Simon Klugel (1808) with 
the attempt made by Mathematical Reviews between the years 1961 and 
1963 to differentiate between pure and applied mathematics, the 
similarities are striking: Probability and Statistics; Numerical Methods and 
the Computer; Domains of Mechanics, Physics, Astronomy; Geophysics; 
Econometrics, Game Theory, Biology and Sociology, Information theory, 
and so on.
The difficulty with this distinction, however, is not only that different sub­
divisions of mathematics turned out to serve “applications” in other 
disciplines, but that this emphasis constantly changed. In the foreword to 
Volume V of their work on the nature and application of mathematics 
(with reference to computers, algebra and analysis) Behnke et at. (1968) 
remarks that what has formerly been abstract is now considered to be 
concrete (for example, matrices). What yesterday was seen as pure is 
today viewed as applied (e.g., functional analysis). What yesterday was 
under suspicion is now seen as respectable (e.g., the theory of 
probability) (cf. Behnke et al., 1968). Areas of mathematical reflection 
that had been considered beyond all possibilities of application later on 
turned out to be useful in different ways.
Given this background, it is no wonder that David Hilbert called number 
theory the queen o f mathematics -  simply because as yet it nowhere 
found any application. Among other things, the upshot of this state of 
affairs is the questioning of the distinction between “pure” and “applied” 
mathematics altogether. It seems more fitting to appreciate mathematical 
endeavours in their own right regardless of whether they are (or have 
been) applied in any non-mathematical context. Laugwitz (1972:224) is
Journal for Pure and Applied Mathematics.
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therefore fully justified in his preference for the expression “mathematics 
that could be applied”.3
This perspective succeeds in freeing mathematics from non- 
mathematical dilemmas, such as the question whether or not euclidean 
geometry was shown to be false by the simple fact that Einstein had to 
use a non-euclidean geometry in his theory of relativity. Stephen Kórner 
remarks:
What can be confirmed or falsified by perceptions -  experiments and 
observations -  is not a geometry or any set of a priori statements but a 
physical theory using the geometry. What was falsified by the 
Michelson-Morley experiment4 was not Euclidean geomtry but a 
physical theory using it. What is confirmed by experiment is not a 
particular non-Euclidean geometry but again a physical theory using it. 
Kant’s thesis that Euclidean geometry is the geometry of perceptual 
space is just as mistaken as the thesis that the geometry of perceptual 
space is not Euclidean (Korner, 1968:69).
Does this mean that genuine mathematics could now be appreciated in 
its abstract generality without fearing any restriction from “experience”?
3. Mathematical platonism
The apparent abstract nature of mathematics leads to an assessment of 
platonism in mathematics. Benacerraf and Putnam call platonists “those 
who consider mathematics as the discovery o f truths about structures 
which exist independently o f the activity or thought o f mathematicians" 
(Benacerraf & Putnam, 1964: 15). This description immediately focuses 
our attention on the nature of “existence”. The following question arises: 
is it meaningful to say that mathematical structures “exist” in the same 
manner as stones, mountains or celestial bodies?
If the answer is positive, then we may have to restrict ourselves to a 
constructivistic or a strict finitistic orientation in mathematics. The most 
important consequence then would be that the infinite in mathematics 
has to be eliminated because physicists estimate that the universe is 
constituted approximately by 1080 atoms -  indeed a finite number.
3 Anwendbare Mathematik (1972:224 ff.; p. 232 ff.).
4 Between 1881 and 1887 Michelson and Morley conducted a series of experiments in 
order to establish whether the velocity of light was different when measured in the 
direction of the earth or perpendicular to it.
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But why and how then is it possible for human beings to imagine finite 
numbers greater that the number of atoms (or elementary particles) in 
the universe? The number 101010 is already such a number.5 Since its 
“size" obviously is not exemplified in the universe one may ask: is it real 
or does it only have an abstract existence within the imaginative mind of 
the mathematician?
The other option is to affirm a different “abstract” order of “existence” for 
mathematical “objects” and “structures”. In this fashion modern mathe­
matics is often described as the science of “formal systems” (cf. Kórner, 
1972:124ff.) Paul Bernays (1976) specifies the term “formal” by equating 
it with “mathematical abstraction”, indicating to him that one only 
considers the structural elements of an object (i.e. the way in which an 
object is composed out of parts).6 He qualifies this characterization still 
further by saying that the mathematician studies “idealized structures" -  
thus implicitly emphasizing the crucial input of the active “idealizing” 
mathematician.
This brings us closer to the meaning attached to the term platonism as it 
was introduced by Bernays in 1934 in order to characterize this particular 
approach to mathematics. Since then, it has acquired a general use in 
literature discussing the foundations of mathematics (cf. Bernays, 1976: 
62-84). Bernays highlights one of the differences between the axiom 
system of Euclid and Hilbert’s axiomatization of geometry (1899) as 
follows. Euclid constructs the “objects” of his theory, whereas Hilbert 
postulates them. For Hilbert the term “exist” is used in a context in which 
all links with the thinking subject is denied. “Since this foremost came to 
expression in the philosophy of Plato I find it appropriate to designate it 
as platonism”.7
With regard to mathematics, he mentions the fact that platonistic 
conceptions extend far beyond the theory of real numbers, since they 
have also been applied in “modern theories of algebra and topology, 
where they have proven very fertile” (1976:65). To this he adds an 
important statement: “This brief summary will suffice to characterize 
platonism and its application to mathematics. This application is so
5 Van Dantzig (1956:273-277) once even wrote an article addressing the question: “Is 
101010 a finite number?”.
6 "d.h. [dass] die Art seiner Zusammensetzung aus Bestandteilen hervorgekehrt und 
ausschliesslich in Betracht gezogen wird" -  Bernays (1976:23, cf. p. 30).
7 “Da diese Tendenz vor allem in der Philosophie Platons zur Geltung gekommen ist, 
sei es mir gestattet, sie als ‘Platonimus' zu bezeichnen" (Bernays, 1976:63).
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widespread that it is not an exaggeration to say that platonism reigns 
today in mathematics” (1976:65).
Perhaps the decisive feature that characterizes a platonistic approach to 
mathematics is given in an expanded use of the idea of infinity. At the 
same time it underscores the core of a platonist understanding of 
mathematics and of mathematical existence. Not without good reasons 
Hilbert (1925:163) remarks: “From time immemorial, the infinite has 
stirred men’s emotions (Gemut) more than any other question. Hardly 
any other idea has stimulated the mind so fruitfully. Yet, no other concept 
needs clarification more than it does”.
What used to be called the potential infinite (or: endlessness taken 
literally) dominated the entire history of mathematics and philosophical 
reflection. Already in 1831 Gauss, the “prince” of mathematics, wrote to 
Schumacher: "So I protest against the use of an infinite magnitude as 
something completed, which is never allowed in mathematics" (quoted in 
Meschkowski, 1972a:31). Without entering into a historical survey 
regarding the notion of infinity as such, it will be necessary in this context 
to refer to the ideas of the mathematically trained philosopher Bernard 
Bolzano. Although he published a work on the Philosophy o f Mathe­
matics in 1810, we only want to mention his notion of infinity in the 
posthumously published work, Paradoxien des Unendlichen (1851, re­
printed 1920). In this work Bolzano discusses the nature of infinite sets 
with their seemingly paradoxical properties, but then positively lifts out, 
as a defining feature, the possibility to establish a one-to-one corres­
pondence between an infinite set and a true subset of the initial infinite 
set (Bolzano, 1920, par. 20:27 ff.) This mathematical formulation finally 
abolishes the supposed universal validity of Euclid’s axiom, also 
defended by Aristotle, namely that the whole is always greater as (prior 
to) its parts (Aristotle, Politica 1253a: 19-20). In fact, this very objection 
turned out to be a distinctive feature of an infinite set as defined by 
Bolzano (1851, reprinted in 1920), Cantor (1879-1884, in Cantor, 1962) 
and Dedekind (1887, in Dedekind 1969) because in the infinite case the 
whole is equivalent to a proper part of it. For example, one can map the 
even integers one-to-one onto all the integers (2 is correlated with 1; 4 
with 2; 6 with 3; and so on) -  showing that the whole set of integers is 
equivalent to a proper subset of the integers (the even integers).
The mathematical significance of this expanded idea of infinity is crucially 
dependent upon the implied relationship of a whole (or: totality) and its 
parts. What is at stake is the idea of an infinite totality. Traditionally this 
idea is taken to transcend the concept of a (potentially infinite) sequence 
without an end and the account given of it usually refers to it as the 
actual infinite. One can say that modern (20th century) mathematics
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emerged as a result of the fruitful employment of this idea of infinite 
totalities during the last 25 years of the nineteenth century (by Weier- 
strass, Dedekind and Cantor). Unfortunately this development revealed 
problems so fundamental that it caused mathematicians to reconsider 
the most basic notions of mathematics, not even excluding the notions of 
number and sets themselves.
In 1900 Russell made public his well-known antinomy -  which can be 
formulated in terms of the ABC of set theory. Consider the set C with 
elements A and the prescription that elements of set C may only be 
those sets A which do not contain themselves as elements.
Thus C = (A/A í  A).8 Now suppose that C is an element of C (C e C). 
Every element of C, however, does not contain itself as an element -  
this, after all, is the requirement for being an element of C. This implies 
that if C is an element of C, it must also meet this requirement -  but then 
C e C implies that C e C. Suppose, on the other hand, that C <f C. Then 
C does meet the requirement for being an element of C, which means 
that C e C. In other words, C is an element of C i f and only if C is not an 
element of C.
C e C o C i C
Puckert and llgauds (1987:147 ff.) argue that Cantor must have 
discovered similar antinomies perhaps as early as 1883. It was only in 
1895 that Cantor revealed that his newly developed set theory is 
antinomic.9
Antinomies like these call for an account of the relationship between 
“thought” and “reality”, between "mathematics” and “the real world”. The 
legacy of platonism seems to have reached a dead end in the discovery 
of the antinomies made known by Cantor and Russell.
8 The set of ten chairs is e.g. not itself a chair and does not contain itself as an element. 
On the other hand, the set of thinkable thoughts is in itself thinkable and therefore 
does contain itself as an element.
9 He has proven the theorem that for every set A of ordinal numbers there exists an 
ordinal number B such that B is larger than any ordinal contained in A. (On this basis 
he also constructed his whole hierarchy of transfinite cardinal numbers.) Consider the 
set W of all ordinal numbers. The mentioned theorem implies that there must exist still 
another ordinal number larger than any ordinal contained in W -  contrary to the 
assumption that W contains all ordinal numbers. A similar antinomy could be 
formulated for Cantor's transfinite cardinal numbers. To overcome these problems, 
Cantor distinguishes between genuine sets and inconsistent sets (“inkonsistente 
Systeme"), such as the set of all transfinite cardinals (cf. his letter of 1899 to 
Dedekind; Cantor, 1962:448; and Meschkowski, 1967:144).
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Partly as a reaction to this situation we soon witness the rise of three 
mutually exclusive approaches -  that of the well-known schools of 
logicism, (axiomatic-) formalism and intuitionism. Even definitions of 
mathematics reflect this divergence. Though it may seem natural to 
relate mathematics as a special science to the aspects of number and 
space in the first place, the way in which most modern mathematicians 
define their subject matter does not explicitly refer to these facets of 
reality. Logicism, for instance Russell, wants to stress that mathematics 
is not concerned with quantity, but with order. Already W. Hamilton 
defined algebra -  in a work from the year 1833 -  as the “science of pure 
time or order in progression” (quoted in Cassirer, 1957:85). In his own 
way Cassirer continues this line of thought which actually goes back to 
Leibniz. Smart points out that according to Cassirer the main purpose of 
the critical study of the history of mathematics “is to illustrate and confirm 
the special thesis that ordinal number is logically prior to cardinal 
number, and, more generally, that mathematics may be defined, in 
Leibnizian fashion, as the science of order” (my emphasis -  DFMS; 
Smart, 1958:245).
This brings us to the alternative approach of intuitionism -  keeping in 
mind that Kurt Gódel’s discovery in 1931 (at an age of 25) forced Hilbert 
and Bernays to revert to intuitionistic methods in their “meta-mathe­
matics” (cf. Hilbert & Bernays, 1934 and 1939).
4. Does the intuitionism of Brouwer bring mathematics closer 
to “reality”?
The special place assigned to ordinal numbers in Cassirer’s assessment 
is explicitly present in Hermann Weyl’s understanding of intuitionism. 
Just as Arend Heyting (cf. 1964:42), Weyl starts with the number one in 
order to generate, step by step, each subsequent number, and then 
concludes from the nature of this process that a general concept relating 
to number could only be formed by means of “complete induction” (Weyl, 
1966:51). “Time as the form of pure consciousness is not an accidental 
but an essential presupposition for the spiritual operations in which the 
meaning of the notion of number is founded” (Weyl, 1966:55). These 
spiritual operations concern possibilities which are open towards infinity 
[the potential infinite (PI)]. Since even the notion of natural numbers -  
such as one and two -  is the result of subjective human reflection (either 
non-theoretical or theoretical) on the primitive meaning of a quantitative 
multiplicity we are justified in this respect to support intuitionism in 
positing the fundamental and primitive meaning of succession. Weyl 
correctly claims that the essential character of the natural numbers, 
expressed in the feature of one, another one, “and so on", cannot
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logically be reduced to something more primitive (Weyl, 1926:11). This 
makes it clear why the hierarchy of types developed by Russell in his 
Principia Mathematica cannot “be described without resort to the intuitive 
concept of iteration” (Weyl, 1946:8). It furthermore elucidates the priority 
given to the primary notion of ordinal numbers in intuitionism (cf. Weyl, 
1921:40, 43, 57, 58, 67; 1966:53), and the rejection of Cantor’s notion of 
cardinal numbers (cf. Weyl, 1921:67). We should note that Weyl here 
acknowledges the finite cardinals, referred to as the “number concept of 
everyday life” (p. 68), but rejects Cantor’s transfinite cardinals as 
“mathematically useless” (p. 67). This is done because Brouwer con­
vinced Weyl that in the construction of mathematics we encounter two 
open domains, possibly entering into the inexhaustible: “the progression 
in the sequence of natural numbers and the continuum” (Weyl, 1926:12). 
It was set theory which thought that it could enclose these two open 
domains of the stream of infinity (1926:13). Later on Weyl declares: 
“Brouwer opened our eyes and made us see how far classical mathe­
matics, nourished by a belief in the ‘absolute’ that transcends all human 
possibilities of realization, goes beyond such statements as can claim 
real meaning and truth founded on evidence” (1946:9). On the same 
page we also read: “The sequence of numbers which grows beyond any 
stage already reached by passing to the next number, is a manifold of 
possibilities open towards infinity; it remains for ever in the status of 
creation, but is not a closed realm of things existing in themselves”; and: 
“Brouwer made it clear, as I think beyond any doubt, that there is no 
evidence supporting the belief in the existential character of the totality of 
all natural numbers”.
Strangely enough, in spite of his emphasis on incompleted infinity, 
Brouwer ultimately proceeds from an anti-piatonistic starting-point. Van 
Stigt points out:
Brouwer upheld the a-priori of mathematical certainty and the 
'spirituality' of the mathematical reality, transcending the limitations of a 
material world, but a reality whose exclusive seat is to be found in the 
individual human mind. Unlike Plato he held that perfection can be 
achieved without abandoning time, action and human individuality. 
Indeed, to Brouwer these are the essential components of mathematical 
reality. His idealization is the process of excluding from human thinking 
all elements except those 'found in the Primordial Intuition’, resulting in 
pure intuitive thinking.
In the Primordial Intuition a new entity is created, which only exists in 
the mind, the sole mathematical universe. Mathematics then is the 
activity of Mind, not with Aristotelian abstracts but with newly created 
elements of Intuition alone. At no stage of the mathematical con­
struction can elements be introduced which are the result of abstraction
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from a physical universe and lack this pure intuitive pedigree (Van Stigt, 
1990:171, 172).
Therefore, instead of conning closer to “the real world", Brouwer’s 
acceptance of incompleted infinity only retires into exile within the indivi­
dual mathematical mind.
5. The conflict between platonism and intuitionism
In modern mathematics, in general, we have two opposite claims. 
Brouwer, on the one hand, abandons Kant’s doctrine of the apriority of 
space but on the other hand at the same time tries to strengthen Kant’s 
doctrine of the apriority o f time. Brouwer explains:
This neo-intuitionism considers the falling apart of moments of life into 
qualitatively different parts, to be reunited only while remaining 
separated by time, as the fundamental phenomenon of the human 
intellect, passing by abstracting from its emotional content into the 
fundamental phenomenon of mathematical thinking, the intuition of the 
bare two-oneness. This intuition of two-oneness, the basal intuition of 
mathematics, creates not only the numbers one and two, but also all 
finite ordinal numbers, in as much as one of the elements of the two- 
oneness may be thought of as a new two-oneness, which process may 
be repeated indefinitely (Brouwer, 1964:69).10
Set theorists tend to see cardinality as the most basic notion of number. 
However, Fraenkel points out that, in general, cardinals could not be 
compared without the “explicit or implicit use of order” (1976:127; cf. 
Fraenkel et at., 1973:80). On the same page he grants that there is 
“hardly a doubt that psychologically the ordered set is primary, owing to 
our experience with spatial order and temporal succession, and that the 
plain set is derived by abstraction”. However, since the plain set seems 
to be the more general notion (based on membership alone), and since 
mathematics usually proceeds from the general to the less general, it 
seems natural, from the logico-mathematical point of view, to begin with 
plain sets and cardinals before introducing ordered sets and ordinals (by 
adding the order relation to the membership and equivalence relation) 
(cf. Fraenkel etal., 1973:127).
The implicit assumption in this argument is given in the starting-point of 
(axiomatic) set theory as such -  the notion of a set entails the whole- 
parts relation which we met earlier with reference to Bernays’ definition of 
mathematics and when we referred to an expanded idea of infinity,
10 Hilbert also wanted to defend the Kantian view on the synthetic a priori nature of 
arithmetical judgements -  cf. Reid, 1970:17.
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acknowledging infinite totalities. The primitive status of the term set in 
axiomatic set theory (for example that of Zermelo-Fraenkel), implicitly 
concedes that the property of being a totality (whole) cannot be reduced 
to purely numerical representations. In reaction to the intuitionistic 
conception of the continuum Bernays correctly remarks: “Intuitionist 
analysis, even though it begins with a much more restricted notion of a 
function, does not arrive at such simple axioms; they must instead be 
replaced by more complex ones. This stems from the fact that on the 
intuitionistic conception, the continuum does not have the character of a 
totality, which undeniably belongs to the geometric idea of the con­
tinuum. And it is this charactersitic of the continuum which would resist 
perfect arithmetization” (Bernays, 1976:74).11
The ultimate divisive factor between platonism and intuitionism is 
therefore given in their respective views on the nature of the infinite: 
intuitionism sees it as an unfinished and incompleted process while 
platonism views it as a totality given at once.
This basic difference had far-reaching consequences. Not only did 
intuitionism reject Cantor’s transfinite number theory and the universal 
applicability of the logical principle of the excluded middle, since indeed it 
constructed a whole new mathematics. Kleene (1952:52) writes: “The 
intuitionists have created a whole new mathematics, including a theory of 
the continuum and a set theory. This mathematics employs concepts and 
makes distinctions not found in the classical mathematics”. Beth (1965: 
89) remarks: “ It is clear that intuitionistic mathematics is not merely that 
part of classical mathematics which would remain if one removed certain 
methods not acceptable to the intuitionists. On the contrary, intuitionistic 
mathematics replaces those methods by other ones that lead to results 
which find no counterpart in classical mathematics”. Finally Stegmiiller 
explains the radical effect as follows:
In the theory of functions of real numbers, it is important to consider 
associations of numbers with whole choice sequences. Here a decisive 
difference arises vis-á-vis the classical conception. Since for the 
intuitionists a choice sequence is not a finished thing, the association of 
a number x with a choice sequence a is possible only if the number x is 
already determined at a finite stage in the growth of the choice 
sequence a. Today this idea is called 'Brouwer's principle’. While sur­
render of the principle of the excluded middle represents a weakening 
of the modes of thought of classical mathematics, Brouwer’s principle
11 Van Stigt (1990:329) remarks: “Unlike Cantor's continuum, conceived as a given 
totality of points, Brouwer’s intuitive continuum is a medium in which points can be 
inserted, a potential for ‘cutting’”.
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produces, from another point of view, a strengthening, so that the 
intuitionistic theory turns out in reality to be not a subtheory of the 
classical theory but a theory of a different kind. This strengthening is 
revealed in the fact that in classical mathematics Brouwer’s principle is 
false. This can be made clear by the following example. Classical 
theory admits a rule associating numbers with choice sequences which 
prescribes that the number 1 is to be associated with the sequence 
consisting exclusively of zeros, and the number 2 with all other 
sequences. Manifestly, this contradicts Brouwer’s principle. For we 
cannot assert at any finite stage of a sequence consisting (up to that 
point) exclusively of zeros that it will contain only zeros beyond that 
point. Hence we cannot replace the above rule with an equivalent one 
by which the number associated with a sequence is already determined 
at a finite stage in the generation of that sequence.
The special character of intuitionistic mathematics is expressed in a 
series of theorems that contradict the classical results. For instance, 
while in classical mathematics only a small part of the real functions are 
uniformly continuous, in intuitionistic mathematics the principle holds 
that any function that is definable at all is uniformly continuous 
(Stegmuller, 1970:331).
From our preceding analysis it is clear that (i) the notion of infinity lies at 
the basis of the divergence between the different schools of thought in 
twentieth mathematics and that (ii) this notion ought to be clarified in 
terms of the interrelationships between the aspects of number and 
space. Before we reflect on the “mathematical side” of the real world we 
first look at an example of the amazing link between mathematics and 
the “real world”.
6. An example of the amazing link between mathematics 
and the “real world”
If “pure mathematics” -  both in the form of its platonistic mind-inde­
pendent conception of “objects” and the latter’s acceptance of “infinite 
totalities” (which find no counterpart in “the real world”) and in the 
intuitionistic individual-mind-centred solipsism -  lack a structural link with 
a mind-independent and platonic-heaven-independent world out there, 
how is it possible to explain the remarkable applicability of mathematical 
theories to various domains of human experience? What brought Kant to 
the conviction that a natural scientific discipline is only scientific 
inasmuch as it is mathematical?
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After the Renaissance natural scientists like Galileo believed that the 
language of nature is written in mathematical symbols.12 When Kepler, a 
contemporary of Galileo (whose mathematical description of movements 
was restricted to motions close to the earth’s surface), obtained his three 
laws describing the motion of heavenly bodies it seemed as if there 
existed two disconnected realms of motion. Only through the formulation 
of his law o f gravity did Newton succeed in developing a unifying 
perspective. This law posits that any two (celestial) bodies attract each 
other with a force that is directly proportional to their respective masses 
and indirectly proportional to the sqaure of the distance between them:
F  = GmMr2
Viewed against the background of Newton's laws of motion this law of 
gravitation produced astonishing results. Although Kepler spent years to 
come up with his three laws, they turned out to be mere mathematical 
consequences of Newton’s law of gravity. This demonstrated that 
heavenly bodies obey the same laws as moving things on earth, and at 
the same time Kepler’s observations were considered to be evidence in 
support of Newton’s law. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of this law 
is precisely its (formal) mathematical character which precludes an 
intuitive understanding: what is really at stake in the attraction of two 
celestial bodies separated by immense distances was never effectively 
demonstrated in a physical way. Morris Kline (1980:56), emeritus profes­
sor in mathematics at the Courant Instituut for mathematical sciences at 
the University of New York, strikingly remarks:
It (‘gravitation’ -  DFMS) is a scientific fiction suggested by the human 
ability to exert force. However, the mathematical deductions from the 
quantitative law proven so effective that this approach has been 
accepted as an integral part of physical science. What science has 
done, then, is to sacrifice physical intelligibility for mathematical 
description and mathematical prediction.
In order to illuminate something of the remarkable history of the conse­
quences of Newton’s formulation of the law of gravity we briefly pay 
attention to a well-known story, the discovery of the planet Neptune.
Remark: The discovery of Neptune (cf. Kline, 1980:62-63).
With the aid of his newly designed powerful telescope W. Herschel 
discovered the planet Uranus in 1781. The problem was that the path of
12 Cf. Dantzig (1947) and consider the statement of Jacobi: God always arithmatizes, 
and of Leibniz who said that God is the “Great Geometer'1
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this planet did not obey the predictions made for it. Alexander Bouvard 
conjectured that this deviation was the effect of another -  yet unknown
-  planet. Various attempts were made to observe or calculate the 
possible size and path of this unknown planet. In 1845 a young student 
from Cambridge, J.C. Adams, on the basis of Newton’s law of gravity, 
calculated a highly accurate estimate of the mass, position and path of 
this unknown planet and sent his calculations to sir George Airy at the 
Royal Astronomical Observatory in Greenwich. The latter failed to 
appreciate the significance of these calculations -  which gave another 
student, the Frenchman J.J. Leverier, the chance to independently 
come up with approximately the same calculations. He communicated 
his findings to the German astronomer Johann Galle. Galle received 
them on September 23 1846 and he discovered Neptune that same 
evening -  with a deviation of only 55 minutes of the path as predicted 
by Leverrier. Kline is certainly justified in asking the question how one 
can doubt the predictive power of a mathematical-astronomical theory 
that manages to make predictions accurate up to one ten thousandth of 
a percentage point.
An integral understanding of created reality may help us to account for 
the interconnectedness of mathematical theorizing and the “real world” 
we live in. We conclude our discussion with a brief indication of what this 
perspective entails.
7. The real world inherently displays a “mathematical side”
Owing to a long-standing one-sidedness in the history o f Western 
thought the term “existence" is constantly identified with the reality of 
concrete entities, such as material things, plants animals and human 
beings. These things constitute the domain of “experience”. If “abstract 
entities” or “properties" were contemplated they were transposed to a 
supra-sensory “ intelligible realm” (as platonism did in all its various 
forms, traditionally also known as realism) or they were embedded in the 
creative powers of the individual (and sometimes: collective) human mind 
(intuitionism and other variants of nominalism).
Clearly, therefore, the traditional opposition between realism and 
nominalism (compare the transition from medieval to early modern 
philosophy) still has a bearing on the foundational questions of mathe­
matics. For example, in their ordinary understanding, sets are universals 
and they partake, in the words of Fraenkel et al. (1973:332) in “the well- 
known and amply discussed classical problem of the ontological status of 
the universals”. The three main traditional answers given to this problem, 
namely realism, nominalism and conceptualism, are connected with their 
modern counter-parts known as platonism, neo-nominalism, and neo­
conceptualism (Fraenkel et al., 1973:332). To make headway in these
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issues, we have to introduce a basic distinction developed in the tradition 
of Reformational Christian philosophy, namely that between modality and 
entity.
The scientific use of general concepts o f function reflects the feature of 
modal abstraction (analysis) which serves as the starting-point for the 
specification obtained when these universal modal notions are used to 
analyse concrete things, such as atoms, plants or aesthetic objects. For 
example, we may distinguish between entitary laws (typical laws) which 
are applicable to a limited class of entities (such as the Coulomb law -  
only applicable to charged entities, or the Pauli principle -  only applicable 
to fermions), and modal laws which, rather than describing a specified 
class of entities, pertain to all kinds of entities (cf. the main laws of 
thermo-dynamics) -  in the words of the physicist Stafleu (1980:11) they 
describe “a mode of being, relatedness, experience, or explanation”.
The mathematician, as well as every other special scientist, has to 
answer the following philosophical basic question of his or her special 
science: what is the delimiting angle of approach of the academic 
discipline concerned? In order to answer this question one might be 
inclined to side-step the real issue simply by enumerating the sub­
disciplines of a specific special science. Suppose an adherent of the 
Bourbaki says: “mathematics is the discipline which ultimately studies 
(the formal systems) o f algebra and topo log f, then the striking fact is 
that the italicized words are not an axiom, theorem or conclusion reached 
in the study of algebra or topology -  which implies that the given 
definition excludes itself from the domain of mathematics. Although one 
has to be acquainted with the contents of mathematics in order to be 
able to formulate this kind of definition, it does not imply that the 
formulation as such is special-scientific in nature -  it remains the task of 
philosophy to answer this basic question. Along this line of thought one 
can differentiate by definition between philosophy and the special 
sciences: those intellectual disciplines which need to transcend their own 
limits when they want to define their field of investigation are called 
special sciences, whereas that peculiar academic endeavour which can 
handle questions like these within its own confines, is called philosophy.
Furthermore, to actually delimit a special scientific angle of approach 
requires that one has to identify the relevant modality (aspect) implying 
that one must simultaneously distinguish it from other modalities. The 
mutual cohering presence both of identification and distinguishing 
stresses the necessity of a philosophical view on the cohering diversity of 
modal aspects -  a view transcending the boundaries of any modally 
delimited special-scientific view-point. In other words, the very nature of
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modal abstraction (analysis) reveals the philosophical dependence of the 
special sciences.
We may now return to our question: is the science of mathematics 
sufficiently delimited by describing it as the science of “formal systems”? 
According to the interpretation of Bernays, which identifies “formal” with 
(idealizing) mathematical abstraction, mathematics considers only the 
structural moments of an object, i.e. the way in which an object is 
composed out of parts. In a certain sense this characterization is both too 
wide and too narrow to delimit the science of mathematics. The first 
shortcoming was sensed by himself when he refers to the fact that all 
areas of research are concerned with structures -  structures of society, 
structures of the economy, the structure of the earth, structures of plants, 
of life-processes, and so on (Bernays, 1976:172). He also realizes that 
mathematicians apply some kind of idealization in their field of study. 
When he said that mathematics handles idealized possible structures it is 
still insufficient, because every modal aspect is to be distinguished from 
concrete things which merely function within these universal aspects (cf. 
Diagrams 1 and 2 at the end of this article in order to see an overview of 
the different aspects of reality and an indication of the structural 
properties of an aspect). No aspect as such is a “concrete entity”13 -  
explaining why the only road to an explicit conception of these modalities 
is given in the nature of modal analysis. The universal scope of these 
modalities is clearly seen when we state that all possible functions of 
entities within them presuppose the universal scope of their modal 
existence -  an existence which we can articulate explicitly only by means 
of modal abstraction, i.e. in the terms used by Bernays, by means of the 
lifting out of “idealized structures”. The fact that idealization, in the sense 
of abstracting universal structural features, not only pertain to modal 
structures (aspects) of reality, but also to the structure of concrete 
entities (exemplified in everyday concepts such as cars, humans, stars, 
animals and so on), was not grasped by Bernays, with the result that he 
was unable to delimit the science of mathematics in a satisfactory way. 
The meaning attached by him to the term “structure”, referring to the way 
in which an object is composed out of parts, is ultimately connected with 
the whole-parts relation which is, as we want to argue, fundamentally 
connected with the nature of the spatial aspect of reality.14 But surely, he 
did not want to say that the field of investigation of mathematics is 
delimited by nothing but the spatial aspect. It would simply imply a
13 Confusing aspects for things is the mistake of reification or hypostatization.
14 We have mentioned that Bernays did see this in another context -  cf. Bernays 
(1976 74, 188).
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geometrization of mathematics similar to the one Greek mathematics 
underwent after the discovery of incommensurability.
Keeping in mind that owing to the unity of creation all modal aspects are 
given in an intimate coherence, we may say at this stage that both the 
aspects of number and space delimit the domain of mathematics as a 
special science.
The acceptance of number and space as fundamental and irreducible 
modes of reality liberates us from a number of one-sided emphases 
present in the history of mathematics.
1. Quantitative and spatial relationships, captured in the mathematical 
concept of function, are onticaiiy given as modes o f existence of 
concrete reality.
2. These two aspects of reality are neither created by the human mind 
(side-stepping a purely constructivistic and intuitionistic approach), nor 
is it possible to comprehend their meaning in a mind-independent way 
(in opposition to mathematical platonism).
3. The history of mathematics explored two opposing reductions:
• The unifying function of number in Pythagorean mathematics was 
found to fail when irrational numbers were discovered. Hippasos of 
Metapontum has proven that the ratio of anyone of the sides of a 
regular pentagram to the length of any diagonal cannot be 
expressed by means of a fraction, i.e. a rational number (see Von 
Fritz, 1954). The absence of a common ratio is designated as 
something incommensurable. In the discovery of the irrational 
numbers, the Pythagoreans were confronted with an unbounded 
and infinite series of numbers which indicated for them something 
formless paradoxically emerging from the form-giving function of 
number. They needed an escape from the fate of irrational 
numbers and discovered it in spatial figure because spatial figure 
has a definite and limited form. Consequently, they translated all 
their arithmetical problems into spatial terms. The possibility of 
avoiding irrational numbers in a geometrical way caused a 
fundamental geometrization of Greek mathematics which involves 
a reduction of number to space.
• The problematic status of the limit concept generated the second 
foundational crisis of mathematics -  a state of affairs that continued 
to exist up to the nineteenth century when -  as we have mentioned
-  Weierstrass, Cantor and Dedekind explored the domain of actual 
infinity (the notion of infinite totalities) in their attempt to remedy the
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shortcomings in the calculus of Newton and Leibniz. This resulted 
in a renewed attempt to arithmetize all of mathematics.
4. However, this process gave rise to the third foundational crisis of 
mathematics which surfaced through the antinomies discovered by 
Russell and Cantor. Thus a “circle” has been completed during the 
past two thousand years, starting with a numerical perspective 
(“everything is number”), passing through the intermediate phase of 
the geometrization o f mathematics and ending during the past century 
in a new version of arithmeticism which envisaged, with the aid of 
modern set theory, to reduce the whole of mathematics once more to 
pure representations of number.
5. As Bernays realized, the irreducibility of space as it comes to the fore 
in the typical totality-character of the continuum, ultimately stands in 
the way of a complete arithmetization of mathematics:
The arithmetizing monism in mathematics is an arbitrary thesis. The 
claim that the field of investigation of mathematics purely emerges 
from the representation of number is not at all shown. Much rather, it 
is presumably the case that concepts such as a continuous curve 
and an area, and in particular the concepts used in topology, are not 
reducible to notions of number (Zahlvorstellungen) (Bernays, 1976: 
188).
6. This perspective does not deny the foundational role of the numerical 
aspect in our scientific knowledge of reality. Without once again 
becoming a victim of the claim that “everything is number”, or even of 
the modern humanistic self-esteem expressed in the words of Bell: “If 
Number rules the universe’ as Pythagoras asserted, Number is 
merely our delegate to the throne, for we rule Number” (Bell, 1965: 
16), we can accept Cassirer’s statement that although number does 
not constitute the essence of things, it does form the basis in which 
rational knowledge is rooted.15
7. Our alternative approach therefore asks for a third option -  one not 
tried out by the above-mentioned reductionisms: accept both the 
uniqueness and irreducibility of number and space on the one hand 
and their indissoluble mutual coherence on the other hand. It does 
look as if Brouwer indeed intended exactly this position in his 
dissertation of 1907:
15 “Der Anspruch, in der Zahl die Substanz der Dinge zu erfassen, tritt freilich allmálich 
zuruck; aber zugleich vertieft und verschárft sich die Einsicht, dass in ihr die Substanz 
der rationalen Erkenntnis wurzelt" (Cassirer, 1910:35).
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Since in the Primordial Intuition the continuous and the discrete 
appear as inseparable complements, each with equal rights and 
equally clear, it is impossible to avoid one as a primitive entity and 
construct it from the other, posited as the independent primitive 
(Brouwer, 1907:8, we have used the translation given by Van Stigt, 
1990:154).
8. In so far as every continuum is a (spatial) whole it must -  even when 
its parts are not mentioned -  simultaneously encompass all its parts. 
However, as soon as we investigate the nature of the parts of such a 
continuous whole, we inevitably discover its foundational coherence 
with the primitive numerical meaning o f succession, because a 
continuous whole admits of an endless succession o f divisions. Every 
genuine continuum is infinitely divisible. In so far as we focus our 
attention on the totality-character of continuity, the static meaning of 
spatial simultaneity comes to the fore. But as soon as the parts of a 
continuous whole are accounted for, the static notion of continuity 
seems to change into an infinitely proceeding sequence of possible 
divisions. The two sides of this peculiar whole-parts relation is nothing 
but a demonstration of the fact that the original meaning of a modal 
aspect (seen in the totality-character of continuity) can only express 
itself in coherence with other aspects (i.e. in the case of the spatial 
aspect, in its foundational coherence with the primitive arithmetical 
meaning of infinity, analogically reflected in the infinite divisibility of 
continuity).
9. Without arguing it in detail, an analysis of the inter-modal coherence 
between the aspects of number and space can show that the rational 
numbers, in a semi-disclosed way, represent an anticipation to a 
retrocipation, i.e. they analogically echo the infinite divisibility of a 
factually extended spatial subject, while such a subject analogically 
reflects the numerical time-order of succession in its infinite divisibility. 
Therefore, the numerical difference between any two rational numbers 
anticipates the totality-character of continuity (similar to the interval as 
a starting point for the intuitionist continuum), but since this 
"difference” is itself “infinitely divisible” (the denseness of the rational 
numbers), the mentioned anticipation to the totality-character of 
continuity is, due to the divisibility of such a whole and everyone of its 
parts, referred back to the law-side of the numerical aspect. This 
property of the rational numbers justifies the qualification semi­
disclosed. The idea of the actual (or: at once) infinite is the first fully 
disclosed structural moment -  at the law-side -  of the numerical as­
pect.
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10. On the basis of an analysis of the history of the notion of the actual 
infinite (systematically I prefer the expression: the at once infinite, to 
be distinguished from the successive infinite as its undisclosed 
counterpart) as well as the way in which it was used mathematically 
by Cantor (and since him in modern mathematics), I have conjectured 
that the only tenable account of its meaning is given in seeing it as a 
deepened structural moment within the numerical aspect, anticipating 
(under the regulative guidance of our spatial intuition) to the spatial 
time-order o f simultaneity (all at once). Only this regulative hypothesis 
accounts for the inter-modal meaning-disclosure evinced in the notion 
of the at once infinite (actual infinity).
11. Owing to its ultimate reductionistic intention, intuitionism distorts 
the original spatial whole-parts relation by accentuating the part- 
element (with its implied infinite divisibility) at the cost of the whole- 
element (with its givenness all at once). The intuitionistic theory of the 
real numbers and the continuum follows a kind of Wittgensteinean 
approach -  it uses the “spatial ladder of wholeness” but immediately 
afterwards discards it while holding on to the infinite divisibility implied 
by it.
12. We may both agree and disagree with Weyl and Brouwer in 
connection with their respective accounts of the primordial intuition of 
mathematics. Weyl is correct in his emphasis on the fact that the 
infinite sequence of natural numbers is more primitive than that of the 
continuum, but wrong in his subsequent attempt to reduce continuity 
to the semi-disclosed meaning of infinity (the infinite turned inwards). 
Although foundational to it, the primitive meaning of infinity (the 
successive infinite) has no “privileged” position in comparison with the 
primitive meaning of space. In so far as Brouwer wants to include both 
perspectives, discreteness and continuity, in his conception of the 
basal intuition of mathematics, we have to support him. Nevertheless, 
we also have to differ from him with respect to his reductionistic (semi­
disclosed) account of continuity in terms of freely proceeding 
convergent infinite sequences of rational numbers that actually denies 
the totality-character of the continuum.
13. It is permissible to develop a semi-disclosed arithmetical 
description of continuity, but then only on the basis of the 
acknowledgment of the irreducibility of the original meaning of the 
spatial whole-parts relation (determined by the spatial time-order of 
simultaneity) -  for otherwise some or other dialectical tension will be
the inevitable result (as is the case with intuitionism) Such a semi­
disclosed arithmetical description of continuity is also relatively
justified in its restricted use of the infinite as something endless.
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Surely, also a fully disclosed arithmetical description of continuity, 
using the regulative hypothesis of the actual (at once) infinite (in which 
the numerical time-order of succession anticipates the spatial time- 
order of simultaneity), is perfectly in order, albeit only on the basis of 
the acceptance of the irreducible spatial time-order -  because in the 
absence of this acknowledgment the outcome will be reductionistic 
and therefore inherently antinomic, ending with an elimination of the 
meaning of space by implicitly (in the use of the actual infinite) starting 
from its irreducibility.
14. From the perspectives gained in this rather unfamiliar analysis we 
are in a better position to clarify the internally antinomic evaluation of 
number and space both in intuitionism and among the adherents of 
the idea of actual infinity in modern mathematics {platonism). These 
two approaches indeed have arrived at positions which are not only 
contradictory, but which are also inversely proportional to each other:
• Intuitionism acknowledges time in mathematics owing to its 
emphasis on the primordial intuition of one, another one, and so on 
(i.e. due to the conditioning role of the numerical time-order of 
succession). Nevertheless, the “culmination-point" of this approach, 
given in its account of real numbers and continuity, had to use an 
essential structural feature of the spatial aspect16 -  an aspect 
whose meaning is traditionally considered to be static and timeless.
• Platonism rejects the notion of time in mathematics altogether but 
agrees at least at one point basically with intuitionism -  the 
acceptance of an arithmeticistic approach. However, it is precisely 
intuitionism’s orientation to the arithmetical order of succession 
which causes it to view time as basic for our primordial intuition. 
Paradoxically enough, platonism’s rejection of time in mathematics 
is actually founded in its emphasis on the static domain of the 
actual infinite -  in other words, on the way in which cosmic time 
expresses itself within the spatial time-order of simultaneity.
• The ironical situation is that, in the final analysis, both approaches 
are arithmeticistic (i.e. trying to reduce continuity to arithmetical 
terms), but nevertheless, contradicting their true (arithmeticistic) 
intentions, both respectively had to use two essential (and irre­
ducible) features of the spatial aspect, namely (i) infinite divisibility 
and (ii) the time-order o f simultaneity.
16 Namely the infinite divisibility implied by the spatial whole-parts relation.
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15. Cantor claims that our concept o f number, which in the finite case 
is captured by “Anzahl” (quantitative number), ought to be subdivided 
into two concepts as soon as we proceed to the domain of the infinite, 
for then the concept of cardinality (“Máchtigkeit”) is required (Cantor, 
1962:181). This brings us back to the question whether the concept of 
(i) ordinal number or that of (ii) cardinal number is basic to mathe­
matics. The former is basic to an undisclosed understanding of the 
meaning of number, while (ii) follows from the deepening (disclosure) 
of the meaning of number in anticipation of the meaning of space.
16. Axiomatic set theory actually captures -  in consistent and indepen­
dent axioms -  structural features of the inter-connectedness of num­
ber and space disclosed under the guidance of theoretical (modally 
abstracting) thought.
In conclusion we refer our alternative account of the ontical (i.e. “real 
world’’) aspectual basis of mathematics as a discipline to a brief sketch 
(Diagram 3) of the uniqueness and inter-modal coherence between the 
aspects of number and space.17
The integral coherence of the dimension o f modal aspects and the 
dimension o f entities ultimately constitutes the ontical connection 
between the aspects of number and space -  delimiting the angle of 
approach of mathematics as a special science -  and all possible entities, 
events and societal relationships that invariably function in these two 
modes. In the final analysis, therefore, the relationship between mathe­
matics and the real world is neither found in an ideal platonic realm nor in 
the creative powers of the thinking mathematician. What is performed by 
the mathematician is an abstracting disclosure of ontically given modal 
properties enclosed within the integral coherence of unique and 
irreducible aspects of reality -  subjected to the overarching creational 
law-order determining and delimiting the on-going dynamics of 
intellectual development taking place within its confines.
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Key concepts:
applied mathematics
infinity
intuitionism
number and space -  mutual irreducibility
Platonism
pure mathematics
Kernbegrippe:
getal en ruimte -  onderlinge onverminderbaarheid
intuisionisme
oneindigheid
Platonisme
suiwer wiskunde
toegepaste wiskunde
118 Koers 65(1] 2000:95-121
D.F.M. Strauss
Diagram 1
The different law-spheres of reality 
distinguished by Dooyeweerd
CREATURES SUBJECTED TO GOD'S CREATIONAL LAW  
Law-Spheres (A spects) M ean ing-nucle j
S
0
CH 1
A
U L
M L1
A FE
FN 0
R
M
S
&
B C
U
E L
T
1 U
R
AN L
G
T
S H1
N
G
S
Certitudinal
Ethical
Juridical
Aesthetical
Econom ical
Social
Sign-mode
Cultural-historical
Logical
Sensitive-psychical
p
L
A
N
T
S
Biotical
T
H
I
N
G
S
Physical
Kinematic
Spatial
Numerical
certainty (to be sure)
love/troth
retribution
beautiful harmony
frugality/avoid excesses
social intercourse 
symbolical signification 
formative power/control 
analysis
sensitivity/feeling 
organic life 
energy-operation
unif. motion/constancy
continuous extension
discrete quantity
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Mathematics and the real world
Diagram 2
The structure of a modal aspect
Time-order
Law-side /  Norm-side
/  ante- and/or retro- \  
cipations
! [analogies]
\  N .  :
^ s u b je c t -s u b je c i
and
subject-object /
\  re la tio n s^ ,,-  ’
Meaning-nucleus 
qualifying all 
analogies
V I 
▼
Guaranteeing the
a) uniqueness
b) irreducibility and
c) indefinability of 
the nuclear meaning 
of each modal aspect
Factual side
Time-duration
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Diagram 3
Lawside
Numerical time-order of succession Spatial time-order of at once
The At Once (actual) InfiniteThe Successive (potential) Infinite 
(The primitive meaning o f infinity (Anticipation from number to the lawside of space) 
at the lawside of number)
Primitive
meaning:
Primitive
meaning:
discrete quantity
N (natural numbers) 
Z (integers)
Q  (tractions)
(Fractions represent an anti-~t
continuous extension
Spatial figures
(|  (the w hole-part relation) successive infinite divisibility
n , . . , ---- £ > •  \ needs the at once infiniteR (real numbers) Antjcjpatjon Í  (The real numbers represent
v  >  the tully spatially disclosed 
^ s t r u c t u r e  of number)
Factual side
The mutual coherence and irreducibility of number and space
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